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Our paper analyzes the current financial crisis starting with some recent developments and 
reactions  in  the  field  of  accounting.  We  find  that  involved  parties  within  the  financial  system 
naturally  look  for  a  “scapegoat”  instead  of  dealing  with  reality.  Moreover,  they  try  to  avoid 
regulations that would reflect their current financial position and performance. Meanwhile, what 
reality reveals us is that we are dealing with a crisis of value, or better said valuation, framed by 
significant changes of paradigms. Starting with thoughts and reactions within trade literature and 
financial environment, we analyze some mechanisms of credit derivatives that propagated the crisis 
within the global financial system. Finally, we prove our point in defending fair value accounting and 
identify key aspects that allow future improvements. The need for informational transparency is 
emphasized through the whole paper. 
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One way of looking at the current financial crisis is that it represents the first great 
recession  affecting  developed  countries  since  the  reorientation  of  the value  creation 
system from goods’ production towards creating intangibles. If we are to analyze the 
situation  considering  an  economic  theory’s  perspective,  this  could  be  Schumpeter’s 
theory
16, the current “destructive creativity”, as some see it, having to determine the 
establishment  of  new  limits  within  the  value  creation  process.  We  are  now  being 
confronted with a certain state of facts, within which those economies that relied on 
intangibles as a competitive advantage, in times when what is considered to represent 
value is not guaranteed through any form of tangible assets or products, are faced with 
the collapse of financial networks, and even evaporation of the fictitious capital that 
allowed the development of the new capitalism. What our paper accomplishes is to 
analyze the reactions of those involved within the accounting information market under 
such difficult circumstances, what is the truth as revealed by analyzing the facts, and 
some reactions within trade literature. All these represent in our opinion chain reactions 
to a new lesson that the capital market and its mechanisms seems to have persisted on 
making us realize.  
 
Methodological approach 
Considering the purpose of our paper, that is to give an accounting perspective 
on  the  current  financial  crisis,  the  starting  point  of  our  analysis  is  naturally  the 
accounting information market. It is there that we found many voices considering 
fair value accounting to be significantly responsible for the current state of facts. 
Furthermore, the structure of the paper is implicit. We have first considered some 
main  opinions  within  trade  literature  on  fair  value  in  connection  to  the  current 
situation, and then proceeded to performing a closer analysis of the situation. This 
required presentation of precise attitudes and requirements that appeared in the field 
of accounting under the pressure of such stressful circumstances. Afterwards, we 
performed an incursion within the credit derivatives market where the roots of the 
current financial crisis can easily be identified. Following these findings, we see how 
the crisis was then perpetuated worldwide. This approach allows us to see the big 
picture while emphasizing accounting issues. 
 
Some thoughts within trade literature  
As mentioned above, what we have tried to accomplish through the literature 
review section is get some insights into what current researches state concerning the 
concept  of  fair  value  and  its  usefulness  during  financial  crisis  that  affect  capital 
markets around the world. By doing so we show that the role of fair value accounting 
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within this process is just to capture the changes appeared in the market prices. Even 
though  the  utilization  of  inadequate  assumptions  for  the  initial  valuation  of  the 
mortgages has surely contributed to mastering the current problems, this represents 
finally an error of valuation and not a problem caused by the application of fair value 
accounting per se. That which fair value actually does is to bring the true dimension of 
these errors of valuation, in the eyes of the investors, in a short interval of time 
(Wallace, 2008). The main difference between recognizing an asset at its fair value or 
at its depreciated cost is represented by the recognition of some unrealized losses or 
gains in the alternative of fair value. However, these losses or gains represent in fact 
changes  in  the  value  of  future  generated  incomes  by  the  considered  asset.  As  a 
following, coming back to the current financial crisis, the losses that banks are ought 
to confess under the option of fair value, captivates in fact the true impact (upon the 
present  and  future  incomes)  at  considering  a  higher  degree  of  underwriting  the 
mortgage credits that had been already given. 
Even if this impact is quite significant, what we must acknowledge is that it only 
represents  a  repercussion  of  a  vicious  circle  previously  formed.  Concerning  the 
decrease  in  the  investor’s  interest  for  structured  derivatives  linked  to  mortgage 
credits, it is true that the drawback from these products is nourished by their fair 
value measurement, but we consider this the normal reaction that investors should 
have had from the beginning towards these products of financial engineering. In 
other words, current fair value measurement does nothing but imposes banks to 
recognize the existence of some real problems created earlier, and making it possible 
to  take  actions,  since  they  will  not  disappear  by  themselves  irrespective  to  the 
postponement  period.  Moreover,  when  these  problems  are  not  recognized,  the 
mechanism could continue, enrolling other investors as naives as the previous ones 
(Matis and Bonaci, 2009). 
Despite all critics brought to the concept of fair value, especially during such 
problematic times, those voices that are arguing for the restriction of its application 
remain  unconvincing  for  at  least  three  reasons.  They  don’t  bring  any  viable 
alternative, while ignoring the negative impact that should result from the loss of 
some  information  that  are  presently  offered within financial  statements, and  also 
altering the distinction between accounting and prudential concerns, which have in 
fact different objectives and they should be separated with great attention (Veron, 
2008). The opponents of fair value loose this dispute from the very start, because 
they do not manage to materialize their arguments through actual solutions, or in 
other terms, they are missing a “counter offer”. If it is easy to identify and underline 
fair value accounting’s deficiencies, it is not so easy to find a better alternative that 
brings  together  the  characteristics  of  relevance,  credibility,  comparability  and 
intelligibility that a large consensus and a series of principles attributes to the actual 
standards in the domain. 
Another  important  aspect  emphasized  within  trade  literature  is  that  such  a 
severe crisis like the current one is not, and could not, be the fault of any one set of 




rapid growth in risk layered subprime mortgages, the inevitable reversal of home 
price appreciation, and unprecedented global market liquidity (Ryan, 2008). It was all 
these factors that brought out the undisciplined behaviors in lenders, borrowers, and 
investors, making them ignore what common sense would have pointed, and that is 
not to forget about ‘fair valuing’ the real risk. As Ryan (2008) points out, “economic 
policy, bank regulation, corporate governance, financial reporting, common sense, 
fear  of  debt  and  bankruptcy,  and  all  of  our  other  protective  mechanisms  were 
insufficient to curb these behaviors”. The author also finds the explanation for this 
type of irrational behavior displayed by investors within Keynes (1936) description of 
behavior underlying upswings in economic cycles: 
Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to 
the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities 
depend on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectations, whether 
moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something 
positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, 
can only be taken as the result of animal spirits—a spontaneous urge to action rather 
than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits 
multiplied by quantitative probabilities (Keynes,1936). 
Fair  value  accounting  or  any  other  valuation  method  has  no  chance  in 
eliminating such behaviors (Ryan, 2008). Where fair value plays an essential role, is in 
informing relatively rational and knowledgeable market participants on an ongoing 
basis, and providing a common set of information upon which market participants 
can recalibrate their valuations and risk assessments when the economic cycle turns. 
This recalibration is essential to occur as quickly and efficiently as possible, as it 
should nowadays. Ryan (2008), as many others mentioned before, also notes that any 
form  of  historical  cost  accounting  would  drag  out  these  recalibrations  over 
considerably longer period, likely worsening the ultimate economic cost of the crisis.  
Matis and Bonaci (2009) empirically dimension various opinions on fair value 
within recent trade literature by analyzing all papers comprised within the 2005 2009 
issues of the 16 international journals in the field of accounting belonging to the 
Thomson Reuters Master Journal List. They document the fact that in the field of 
financial instruments most of the authors sustain fair value accounting, especially 
through  results  obtained  within  empirical  studies.  Moreover,  they  find  that  even 
those  studies  who  argue  against  fair  value  within  empirical  studies,  explain  their 
position by some of the concept’s shortcomings in cases when objective data coming 
from active markets are not available. Another important finding of their study is 
that opinions within the analyzed trade literature have not been significantly affected after 
the crisis became noticed, the ‘pro studies’ recording a constant number through the 2005 
2009 period, while ‘against studies’ were even fewer after year 2007. 
We can conclude upon analyzing opinions within trade literature that identify serious 
issues related to practical aspects of fair value accounting, the main problem being actually 
related to the fact that it affects the income statement through unrealized gains and losses, Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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by  ironically  going  back  to  what  Solomons  (1961)  was  predicting  concerning  to  the 
importance carried out by profit measurement, that might record a descending evolution: 
Each  one  of  us  undoubtedly  thinks  of  the  future  in  a  different  manner. 
However,  my  own  suspicion  is  that,  as  for  where  the  history  of  accounting  is 
concerned,  the  next  25  years  may  afterwards  be  seen  as  the  twilight  of  results’ 
measurement (Solomons, 1961, p. 383). 
We also join Georgene B. Palacky
17’s opinion, who as a representative of the 
investors and their interests stated: 
I wish I could see people giving up talking about fair value as being the problem 
within  this  situation,  and  focusing  on  fundamental  problems:  lack  of  market 
discipline, underwriting process and practices within the subprime sector, and the 
rewards obtained by actually challenging risk … it is too much noise for something 
that does not represent the real problem. It is just a manner of distracting attention 
from actually dealing with real issues (Georgene B. Palacky, director of CFAI). 
After clearly pointing that trade literature actually supports fair value accounting 
even thorough such difficult times, we must now go to those aspects that started our 
research. That  is  some  unjustified  reactions  among parties  involved  in  the  credit 
derivatives  market  that  will  actually  be  proven  self  interested  when  blaming 
accounting and not taking responsibility for their own implication.  
 
First reaction   naturally identifying a “scapegoat” 
As stated before, the concept of fair value and its merits have always determined 
strong  debates,  especially  in  the  field  of  financial  instruments.  Still,  the  current 
financial crisis has clearly generated an intensification of these debates. It seems that 
combining  the  accounting  fair  value  principle  and  the  rules  on  banks  capital 
adequacy, also having strong connections with accounting, might have had a pro 
cyclical effect. Some banks and insurance companies’ managers reacted by blaming 
accounting standards for the actual state of facts. This is easy to understand since it is 
much  easier  to  blame  accounting  standards  rather  than  rules  within  the  banking 
system, considering that they are still under close observance of bank supervisors. An 
important and significant aspect we consider the fact that the participants at the G20 
summit did not blame the principle of fair value in November 15, 2008. The public 
declaration following it did not refer to fair value, although accounting authorities 
were  asked  to  …  work  on  improving  the  guidance  for  securities’  valuation, 
considering  some  complex,  illiquid  products,  especially  during  difficult  periods 
(Rérolle, 2008). 
All debates on fair value measurement intensified during recent periods,  big 
financial institutions having to recognize within their financial statements losses of 
more than 150 billion $, mostly under the use of market values (Beller et al., 2009). 
                                                            
17 Director of the Group for Financial Reporting Policies  within the Chartered Financial Analyst 





18  is  investigating  the  possibility  of  use,  by  some  entities  under 
research, of different market values for the same securities. From this perspective, 
nobody  can  deny  the  fact  that  the  use  of  fair  values  involves  some  problems, 
especially in extremely difficult periods from the market’s point of view. For all that, 
the defenders of fair value bring as an argument, its capacity to ensure a certain 
connection  to  reality,  associated  with  another  aspect  of  reality,  namely  own 
shortcomings of alternatives for the market value. We refer here to the fact that, 
neither the reflection value of some elements only in their costs, under the historical 
cost principle, would not provide investors a better image concerning the problems 
that financial institutions are now confronting (Matis and Bonaci, 2009, p. 126). 
Nevertheless, since the end of September and beginning of October 2008, Wall 
Street Journal published a series of articles that described how the banking industry is 
revolted against fair value accounting, bringing a series of criticisms, mainly because 
these would impose them to diminish their assets’ value within the balance sheet, 
often going lower than values showed on the market. It seams that the financial 
institutions militate for an elimination of the fair value, seen as a partial solution for 
the  banking  industry  nuisances.  Wall  Street  Journal  presented  a  letter  of  the 
American Bankers Association – ABA, asking SEC to recognize that fair value has 
no significance within illiquid markets.  
Meanwhile, remarkable personalities belonging the banking industry (such  as 
Martin  Sullivan,  the  former  executive  director  of  AIG  and  Henri  de  Castries, 
executive  director  of  AXA)  considered  fair  value  and  the  use  of  market  based 
valuations on a large scale to be a major factor of the current financial crisis (Hughes 
and  Tett,  2008).  As  a  reaction  to  these  statements,  the  European  Commissioner 
Charlie  McCreevy  also  expressed,  in  last  year’s  spring,  his  concern  regarding  the 
impact of market based valuations in those cases when markets become generally 
illiquid and irrational (McCreevy, 2008). 
The only way we can argue against these unjustified reactions is by analyzing the 
credit derivatives market and showing where things really went wrong and which 
were those factors that determined the current state of facts. 
 
Looking for the truth within the mechanisms of credit derivatives  
Determining the degree to which the current financial crisis can be connected to 
fair value measurement can only be judged after a short introspection within those, 
mechanisms, which in time, have created an extremely problematic situation raised 
within capital markets around the world. That is why we have to start with the origin of 
the  problems  appeared  on  credit  markets,  and  more  specific,  mortgage  backed 
securities and different financial instruments, more or less complex, further structured 
from them. We will therefore refer to the technique of securitization, which consists in 
transforming the existent credits in titles on the capital market.  
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Presented from an accounting point of view, securitization represents a financial 
technique through which a financial institution or a company (the transferor) creates a 
separately  legal  system  (the  already  well known  Special  Purpose  Entity     SPE)  to 
which it transfers financial assets, such as loans and receivables (towards a debtor). The 
following figure presents all elements that need to be considered from an accounting 
perspective: 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the securitization process 
 
Source: Kendall (1998) quoted by Niu (2007) and Abd Allah (2009) 
 
The Special Purpose Entity is the one issuing securities that are then offered to 
investors, being launched on the market and given prices by the underwriter, usually 
an investment bank. The Special Purpose Entity will transfer the money paid by 
investors who purchase the structured derivatives to the transferor (who transferred 
the financial assets). The process often involves a credit enhancer that is supposed to 
attract investors and a rating agency that should reduce risks assumed by investors 
from their point of view. 
Abd Allah (2009) quoted this year some previous studies whose statements now 
have a different dimension and attract special attention, after the lesson has been 
personally delivered to us: 
While the market for securitization is growing and getting more popularity for 
the collective benefits obtained by the participating parties in the process (Jobst, 
2006), the technique should devote much caution so as not to lead to financial crises 
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We will furthermore detail the securitization process in order to better analyze 
it. Special Purpose Entities’ assets are therefore formed by receivables, materialized 
in mortgage credits overtaken by the investment banks from the commercial banks. 
These new SPEs will surely issue their own shares that will be sold on the market, at 
as higher prices as possible, surely higher than the value of the corresponding assets 
(materialized in mortgage credits). It is these shares issued by SPEs that are known as 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). For a long period of time, this sell was possible 
due to the fact that investors’ appetite was maintained through the increase in the 
support  assets’  prices  of  those  certain  securities,  especially  in  real  estates  that 
represented  the  mortgages  for  the  credits.  SPEs’  shares were  sold  on  the  capital 
market  through  Initial  Public  Offerings.  Through  such  a  sale,  investment  banks 
recovered more than they have paid to commercial banks in order to overtake the 
mortgage credits, this way obtaining a profit. Meanwhile, the mortgage credits, as 
assets (receivables) of the new opened SPEs became a receivable held in fact by 
those investors who purchased shares. The next figure makes a synthesis of the role 
of the investment banks: 
 
Figure 2. Mortgage credits’ transfer system  
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Those shares issued by these SPEs are well known within trade literature as 
Mortgage Backed Securities, representing in fact securities backed up by mortgage 
receivables. Furthermore, we will refer to them as MBS. They represent securities 
that can be transitioned by the entity, offers the entity the right of encashment of 
rates and interests, encashment guaranteed through mortgage. In this situation, if one 
of the mortgage credits’ beneficiary could not face up the payments, the entity has 
the right to sell the mortgage property in order to recover the investment. It is shown 
in this way how the intermediary chain in mortgage credits gets longer and longer, 
each link following its own profits through the creation of its own joint point, when, 
in fact, the main connection is between the beneficiaries of the loan (borrowers) and 
the ones who actually finances the loan, the investors that buy securities like MBS. 
Considering  the  investors’  point  of  view,  this  approach  is  different  from  simply 
granting a loan because by owning the MBS, the investors have the right to receive 
the rates and interest the beneficiaries owe, but in the same time they guard a low 
share  resulting  from  the  fact  that  this  securities  can  be  sold  according  to  the 
circumstances (Matis and Bonaci, 2009). In other words, the securities assure the 
investors a certain liquidity regarding the market within which they are transitioned. 
Still, a real accounting issue is valuating these MBS, this being influenced by a series 
of factors that have to be taken into consideration, such as the probability that the 
mortgage credit’s beneficiary could not make the payment on time, that they will pay 
back the credits in advance, the evolution of the interest on short term, all of these 
needing complex valuations based on models, more ore less well used. 
It is also a well known fact that investors on the capital market have different 
profiles. Therefore we must consider investors that will accept a lower income if they 
can benefit of a certain safety for their investment, but also investors that can be 
attracted only by the possibility of obtaining a high revenue, proportional with their 
expectations and assumed risks. It is also possible that in the considered situation of 
credit derivatives, some of the investors will have certain boundaries related to the 
perceived  risk  being  imposed  by  law,  as  for  example  mutual  funds.  The  way  of 
answering the interests of as many as possible investors is through the creation of an 
instrument derived from the securities issued by the special purpose entities (MBS). 
In fact, this is also the role of derivatives, obtained by the division and structuring of 
an asset in such way that risk dispersion is made through an asset derived from the 
original one.  
We  will  maintain  the  same  circumstances  previously  mentioned  in  order  to 
explain the mechanism for developing such a derivative, with the only difference 
that, the SPE will not emit MBS having the same characteristics, but, first, it will 
structure these securities in three big categories or trenches. These three trenches are 
known  within  trade  literature  as  Senior,  Mezanine  and  Equity.  That  which 
differentiates the investors in the three groups is the undertaken risk and the gained 
reward or the investment’s rate of return, combined as shown within the next figure. 
Moreover,  the  created  structure  has  the  form  of  Collateralized  Debt  Obligations 




derived structure could be accomplished with any kind of loan guaranteed by an 
asset.  
 
Figure 3. CDOs structure 
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Source: Matis and Bonaci (2009, p. 144) 
 
An even more complicated derivative, with major contributions to the current 
financial crisis, allowing easy and quick transfer of mortgage credits, and therefore 
encouraging banks to assume bigger risks and completely forget about prudence, is 
the Credit Default Swap (CDS), representing the derivative financial instrument with 
the fastest ascension in the financial sector. 
For banks, transferring those risks associated with their financial assets has the 
ability  to  generate  multiple  favorable  effects,  such  as  better  risk  management, 
establishing  some  differentiated  capital  requirements,  as  well  as  improving  their 
credit  ranking.  Moreover,  improving  their  credit  ranking  also  involves  lower 
financing costs because the bank’s risk profile is one of the considered elements 
when  calculating  the  interest  rate  for  their  financing.  Meanwhile,  credit  rating 
represents an evaluation of the bank’s solvability, based on the history of its previous 
borrowings and reimbursements, as well as on its objective possibility of encashment 
regarding its receivables from its debtors, and therefore be able to settle its own 
financial obligation. The specific manner in which banks can transfer credit risk that 
is associated to their financial assets is represented by the so called credit derivatives 
(Radocea, 2005, p. 21). 
Creation  of  the  capital  markets’  practice  within  the  Anglo American  space, 
credit derivatives are standardized contracts that make the object of over the counter 
transactions. As their own name shows it, the value of such a financial instrument 
derives from valuating the credit risk that is associated to the portfolio of financial 
assets (Radocea, 2005, p. 21). We must therefore consider the frame contract set up 
Investment’s rate of return 
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risk Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association   ISDA, with its 1992 and 
2002  versions,  or  the  so called  European  Master  Agreement  of  the  European 
Banking Federation – EBF. 
CDS actually represent contracts through which a financial institution (the one 
buying  the  protection)  pays  a  premium  to  another  entity  (the  one  selling  the 
protection), the later committing to pay a previously established amount in case one 
of the borrowers (debtors of the buyer) will not follow his obligations, namely will 
not pay the accumulated debt. The main difference between a CDS and an ordinary 
guaranty agreement or insurance considering credits, is the fact that the operation is 
done without  the  borrower’s  knowledge, without  modifying  the  initial  agreement 
signed with the client. The premium paid by the buyer depends on a number of 
factors such as the debtors’ credit rating, the product’s maturity and possibilities of 
the borrower defaulting on obligations. For the buyer of the protection, CDS allows 
him to cover his risks by transferring them upon the seller of the protection.  
Consequently, when an insurance company issues such an instrument in order 
to cover the risk first undertaken by the one granting the loan, the whole package 
becomes insured since insurance companies should issue this type of instruments 
based on justified reasoning. This should also be guaranteed through the rating given 
by rating agencies (such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s) to insurance companies. 
In other words, the default risk does not refer to the beneficiary anymore, but to the 
insurance company whose status is reflected through its rating. 
Aiming to obtain as many premiums as possible, insurance companies issued far 
too many such derivatives, without maintaining sufficient capital in case they should 
honor  their  commitments.  They  rather  ignored  the  worst  scenario  when  a  large 
number of borrowers would default on their payments, again the responsibility for 
signalizing the cumulated risks belonging to rating agencies. Moreover, hedge funds, 
or  any  other  investors  as  a  mater  of  speaking,  analyzed  the  CDS’s  market  and 
identified  situations  in  which  CDS  addressed  extremely  risky  debtors,  therefore 
interested  in  purchasing  such  CDS  while  betting  on  the  debtor’s  default,  this 
meaning the insurance company would have to compensate the investor. Therefore, 
instead of directly lending the borrower who would impose a higher risk, the new 
investor would  rather
19  buy  CDS  issued  by  the  insurance  company  (which imply 
                                                            
19 The attractivity of these derivatives for investors relies on the fact that they only assume paying 
(usually quarterly) a premium that is calculated as a percentage of the instruments’ notional value, 
while the debtor’s default involves the owner of the instrument receiving from the insurance company 
the entire notional value of the contract, his gain only being therefore diminished by the value of the 
premiums that were already paid. That is how the investor hopes on the debtor’s default while the 
insurance  company  bets  on  the  debtor’s  ability  to  handle  all  his  commitments,  this  bringing 
encashment of premiums without any effort on its behalf. Meanwhile, the real problem in this game 
of financial engineering is creating some values that are not connected to reality as real value added 
supposes. Another reason for CDS market doubling from year to year since 2001 to 2007 is owed to 
the fact that the buyer of the protection doesn’t need to own receivables toward the debtor in order to 
buy CDS. Everything the investor needs to do is bet on a debtor’s default, pay the premium towards 




lower risks) hoping that the debtor will default on his obligations and the insurance 
company  will  compensate  him  in  accordance  to  the  foresights  of  the  purchased 
instrument. Furthermore, the naivety of insurance companies is predictable, them 
being tempted by the thought of collecting even more premiums, and considering 
that the risk won’t happen. This is how they ended up issuing CDS whose values are 
larger than the value of the corresponding credit contracted by the debtor. 
The  attractivity  of  these  instruments  created  in  the  market  unthinkable 
connections. The big problem is that one debtor
20’s default can implicitly generate 
for the insurance company obligations towards a series of investors who bought 
CDS on that debtor, the value of the sold derivatives sometimes surpassing the value 
of the credit that was initially contracted by the debtor. Even when considering an 
optimistic scenario that supposed the insurance company being able to respect its 
commitments, this could significantly affect its capitalization and therefore bringing a 
lower rating and decreases in the value of the already signed contracts. Furthermore, 
the reaction of those investors in CDS that had direct relations with the debtors (the 
ones  actually  buying  protection)  is  again  predictable  since  the  insurance  on  the 
debtor’s debts now becomes more riskier for them. 
Insurance companies possibility of issuing contracts with uncontrollable values 
without  meanwhile  maintaining  the  adequate  level  of  capital,  correlated  with  the 
interests  of  different  investors  on  the  market,  all  framed  within  two  essential 
assumptions,  namely  that  ratings  given  by  rating  agencies  were  correct  and  that 
insurance companies are able to honor all commitments corresponding to all issued 
CDS, created an extremely dangerous environment, waiting for the sparkle to launch 
the disaster. The collapse of a large company can therefore attract a domino effect 
that  would  bankrupt  hundred  of  other  institutions  and  entities,  being  connected 
through CDS and similar derivatives. However, maybe this is what Warren Buffett 
(2003) was thinking about when he said that derivatives represent financial weapons 
of mass destruction. The next figure illustrates how CDSs work: 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
their commitments. Therefore, a product meant to be a hedging instrument became a possibility for 
investors to bet on almost any transaction within the credit market. 
20 The presentation of the derivative was simplified in order to simplify its understanding, but the real 
phenomena took significantly larger proportions. Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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As we can see, the same loan contracted by the borrower (debtor) can in the 
same  time  be  structured  into  complex  derivatives  through  securitization  and 
subjected to issuing CDS, therefore generating an extremely high risk. What we must 
always keep in mind is that each contract involves two parties, one still recording 
gains. What is clear though, is the fact that all these facts are not the result of fair 
value accounting.  It  is  our  opinion  that  even  through  difficult  times  information 
provided within financial statements must reflect what is happening on the market. 
Providing adequate information concerning the techniques and assumptions used in 
determining fair value represents a good way of insuring informational transparency 
that is vital for investors (Seidman, 2008).  
 
From  mechanisms  to  consequences:  the  propagation  of  the  financial 
crisis  
It is nowadays obvious that the crisis’ effects have been propagated even within 
those  economies  that  first  saw  optimistic  scenarios,  hoping  that  a  certain 
shortcoming of their national capital markets that were less developed would turn 
into an advantage, the low market efficiency theoretically representing an obstacle in 
transmitting information. The first signs of the crisis became known by the middle of 
year  2007,  on  the  subprime  market  segment  that  represented  15%  of  the  total 
mortgage credit market and which is responsible for more than half of all credit 
defaults (Tarus, 2008). Another factor stimulating the crisis was financial institutions’ 
loose policy in the USA, who used low interest rates by 2003 – 2005 in order to help 
the market recover after the IT crisis in the ’90s.  
After  the  looses  investors  recorded  through  IT  investments,  many  of  them 
started to look for what they considered to be safe investments, without properly 
analyzing the products they were buying. They were only assuming that real estate, 
which was quite tangible for them in comparison to the value of securities of an 
online portal, represented a safe investment, ignoring the possibility of a number of 
factors interacting and sometime generating significant price decreases. High level of 
demand for real estate on the market implicitly generated the prices in that field to 
rise. 
From hereafter, the chain reaction operated on different levels: high prices for 
real estate determined the raise of demand for mortgage credits, while creditors were 
more and more willing to accept exotic derivatives, which were flexible, but also 
riskier. We are referring here to credits with low initial interests and no advances 
required, but which in time imposed high burdens for the borrowers who did not 
afford the rates that became larger. The vicious circle was therefore created based on 
unconscious loans undertaken by the beneficiaries, but also on irresponsible lending 
policies of financial institutions (Tarus, 2008). However, once the beneficiaries could 
not  handle  their  commitments  any  more,  all  problems  came  to  the  surface. The 
incorrect valuation of risks associated to these debts became obvious and implicitly 
the real estate market fall, further inducing a domino effect upon all derivatives they 
were backing. Even when borrowers gave up the mortgaged assets, banks were not Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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able  to  recover  the  loaned  amount  since  prices  on  the  real  estate  market  were 
extremely low, houses being less valuable than the credits they carried.  
This virus of the mortgage credits on the subprime market was projected within 
the entire global credit system through the above presented derivatives that reached 
portfolios around the world. All these risks becoming acknowledged further induced 
a confidence crisis, once again propagated within the whole global credit market. 
This determined loans on international markets to be very expensive, now creating a 
liquidity crisis because of the fact that banks were limited the access to cash necessary 
for them to carry out their lending activities.  
This  was  how  the  crisis  first  started  on  the  subprime  market  in  the  USA 
managed to find its way into the global credit market, national banks being forced to 
deal with raising costs for the money borrowed from creditors outside their country. 
Translated for credit beneficiaries, this means credits that are more “expensive”. This 
does not mean that developing countries did not also promote irresponsible lending 
policies on their own, but often on different levels. Panic and lack of trust that was 
this way generated on the market is just even by only thinking of world wide well 
known financial institutions, mostly banks, which went bankrupt during the crisis.  
Going back to current circumstances, it is quite difficult to delimit which are the 
actual problems and which are the causes. It is certain that in the financial system, the 
one that should mobilize financial resources with the purpose of adding value in the 
economy by assuring the transfer of the disposable capital between the investments 
or the projects, nowadays stopped to accomplish this function, being more interested 
in  self preserving.  The  main  factors  that  led  to  this  situation  are,  really,  those 
derivatives, now called toxic assets, created based on complex structures, but which 
depend in fact of mortgage credits offered by banks and the previously described 
mechanism. In the moment the interest rates grew, the beneficiaries started not to 
pay their rates and interests at time, this being a mass phenomenon, it is explicable 
why the real estates’ prices fell. In this phase, already there was a series of banks that 
had portfolios of derivatives such as CDOs, whose value has constituted a major 
problem for banks. A significant decrease in the value of this type of assets, now 
toxic, could evidently lead to a lower value of the assets related to the bank’s debts, 
and  implicitly  to  negative  equity.  A  comparison  can  be  made  here  between  the 
situation of the beneficiaries who now own houses at a value much lower than the 
contracted mortgage credit, and the situation of the banks that in a similar manner 
through the same effect, has now an asset portfolio much less valuable than their 
debts, both reaching as a conclusion to a negative equity (Matis and Bonaci, 2009). 
Moreover, market prices of the banks’ shares fell significantly, resulting in liquidity 
problems and nobody trusting the bank loans. 
Data presented by the World Bank showed that after only 10 years from the 
appearance of CDS derivatives, the market for CDS contracts reached 54,6 billions $, 
while the global economy Gross Domestic Product in 2007 was only 54,3 billions $. 




the false premise considering some institutions are Too Big to Fail we ended up to 
circumstances showing us that they are actually Too Big to Save. 
 
Concluding remarks 
What is now obvious is the fact that the current financial crisis has opened for 
discussion  certain  areas  within  the  capital  market  that  are  less  regulated  and 
controlled,  such  as  mortgage  markets  and  derivatives  markets. A  clear  effect  the 
financial crisis has is the rethinking and reforming of the financial systems through 
the introduction of new measurement systems and valuation of financial risks but 
also through higher control on behalf of regulatory institutions, where investment 
funds, pension funds, life insurance funds and mortgage credits are concerned (Paun, 
2008).  We  therefore  find  it  appropriate  that,  under  normal  circumstances,  assets 
should be valuated at what they are worth from the market’s point of view, the 
market being the only valid standard of value. On the other hand, we do not know 
exactly what to do when the market does mot function normally … what standard 
do we apply then? (Wallison, 2008). 
Our pleading in favor of the concept of fair value is not meant to argue that this 
concept is flawless, in the same time being aware that current standards will for sure 
be further amended to better suit the accounting information market’s needs, as even 
IASB
21’s president suggested not long ago (Tweedie, 2008). The goal given to fair 
value accounting and market based valuation, does not seem so exaggerated if we 
integrate it in the whole picture that presents financial markets’ characteristics in a 
constantly developing environment that keeps facing us with lessons learned from 
past crisis. Restricting the use of fair value accounting not only that it would not heal 
the wounds of the actual financial crisis, but on the contrary it would risk to make 
them worse, diminishing the trust level that investors have in financial statements of 
financial institutions (Veron, 2008). Other changes are necessary for facing the crisis’ 
challenges, changes that should solution the deficiencies revealed at different levels. 
However, beyond the fair value concept itself, it would be advisable to approach 
the  implementation  aspect,  often  underestimated,  especially  at  Europe’s  Level 
(Veron, 2008). The quality and consistency at an international level, regarding the 
implementation of an accounting referential are vital to assuring a financial stability, 
as the Banking Supervision Committee shows within Euro system, still before the 
first signs of the crisis (European System of Central Banks – Banking Supervision 
Committee, 2006). 
It is our belief that the current orientation towards market based valuations, in 
risk management as well as in accounting purposes, which we consider will persist at 
international level, also solicits certain abilities of the valuators, abilities that should 
be  proven.  The  institutions  would  have  to  prove  the  capacity  of  performing 
intelligent and justified valuations of assets and liabilities within the balance sheet, 
these including complex derivatives as the ones found in the centre of the current 
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financial crisis. As in the case of a driver’s license, these proves have the role to offer 
the entity’s auditors a reasonable assurance that the valuator has sufficient knowledge 
and abilities in order not to create any damage towards any implied parties (Deventer, 
2008).  Unfortunately,  the  current  financial  crisis  brought  to  surface  severe  cases, 
where no valuation at all is done before committing to an investment and where 
alternatives were not even searched for achieving some kind of estimations upon the 
market value, when the considered derivatives were less traded. To these we can add 
those  cases  in which  inadequate valuation  models were  used, without  giving  any 
helpful information in taking a fundamental rational decision. 
What the current financial crisis has confirmed regarding fair value, is that the 
most dangerous situation is created when the entire valuation process is based on the 
entity that transactions the securities, without existing any independent confirmation 
of  the  created  values,  from  an  auditor  or  from  an  entity  responsible  for  risk 
management  (Deventer,  2008).  We  refer  here  to  the  3
rd  level  input  data  that  is 
allowed only as a final alternative, in the impossibility of applying the previous two. 
In addition, in this case, accounting standards solicit the disclosure of information 
that would fully permit the investor to give a certain trust degree to the valuation 
process, taking the best decision in the given circumstances. 
As for the banking industry’s argument that fair value would be irrelevant within 
inactive markets, this would mean that using fair value accounting would not offer 
any type of useful information to investors, regarding the true economic value of the 
concerned derivatives. Nevertheless, as it was previously shown, the decrease in fair 
values  of  those  derivatives  issued  in  the  last  years  is  fully  correlated  with  the 
significance of the default degree in comparison with what was expected at the initial 
moment of the issuance. Since these fair values have the capacity to estimate the 
impact of a higher degree of defaults upon the future and present earnings generated 
by these derivatives, we assume that we cannot consider them lacked of significance. 
Also based on these assumptions, we consider that a present or future limitation of 
fair value accounting would just ‘hide’ current realities, only making the mechanism’s 
effect that has triggered the financial crisis longer.   
In a valuator’s opinion, one of the positive effects of the current financial crisis 
is that of bringing some light upon those debates that concerned the concept of fair 
value, from two key aspects’ point of view, urging us to give up a certain accounting 
utopia that kind of took over the current environment, and get back to financial 
realities (Rérolle, 2008). The first aspect refers to the fact that from a conceptual 
point of view, creating a balance sheet that has the ability or that needs to offer a true 
and fair view of the market value of the entity is a great ideal, while the market is far 
too complex in order to be captured by an accounting system.  
The  second  aspect  is  that  the  valuation  process  involves  a  high  degree  of 
subjectivity,  and  framing  this  process  by  a  series  of  accounting  rules  may  be 
dangerous. (Rérolle, 2008) appreciates that luckily, restrictions imposed to patrician 
valuators were quite relaxed. Therefore, simply offering larger and more powerful 




more realistic image of the entities. Even more necessary is the acknowledgement of 
both limits of accounting through its nature, and complexity of economic reality 
whose reflections needs to be accomplished.  
Placing value in the center of accounting standard setting bodies’ reasoning may 
induce  some  assumptions  regarding  to  information  being  efficiently  transmitted 
within the market, generating securities’ prices that represent a true and fair reflection 
of  the  entities’  performances.  All  these  are  happening  while  each  financial  crisis 
brings significant doubts concerning the above mentioned association. We therefore 
can state that we are dealing with a valuation crisis 
 
…from many points of view, the current financial crisis is connected to valuation 
(Noyer, 2008),  
 
but at the root of this crisis we actually find the growing complexity of the value 
creating mechanism, the recurrent dynamic between market value and fundamental 
value, and last, but not least the amplification of the gap between our own intellectual 
models concerning value and the new paradigm of value. Fundamental value of an 
entity mainly depends on how its assets are put into good use, but we cannot ignore 
the opportunities the entity might hope to have in the future based on her position 
or strategy.  
In order to create value, a company must generate and maintain decisive and 
long  lasting  competitive advantages  that  allow  it  to  put  its  assets  into  good  use, 
exceeding the cost of its capital (Rérolle, 2008). In a global economy, that involves 
intangibles,  competitive  advantages  can  be  difficult  to  recognize  (Rérolle,  1998). 
Economic  benefits  and  costs  of  an  alliance  or  temporary  understanding  with  a 
business  partner  or  even  a  competitor  cannot  be  clearly  identified.  Uncertainty 
towards  the  origin  and  beneficiaries  of  future  cash  flows  is  determined  by  the 
intangibility of some assets and of the offer itself (Davis and Meyer, 1998). 
We  consider  that  all  these  issues  that  are  nowadays  raised  on  improving 
transparency where fair values are concerned will lead towards the origins of the 
problems, making us acknowledge basic theories of capital markets. Another aspect 
of the truth we cannot forget is that investors make their own adjustments upon 
available information while using it for their own needs. This approach would reduce 
to a certain degree the importance of the information first being processed by entities 
and trapped within accounting regulations. As Rérolle (2008) quite properly puts it, 
the market needs transparency to a greater degree than it needs standards. 
We conclude our pleading by saying that fair value can under no circumstances 
be  considered  guilty  for  the  current  financial  crisis,  but  only  its  messenger. This 
would also explain some of the reactions connected to accounting information, since 
we all know what the general reaction towards the messenger is. Fair value has the 
role  of  bringing  us  closer  to  reality,  but  it  can  only  be  done  through  correct 
implementation and high level of transparency. As for its shortcomings, we consider Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 4, No. 3 
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they can be reconsidered and adjusted in time, financial markets being extremely 
favorable for developing a series of innovations that must be closely monitored.  
As we are all currently witnessing, derivatives can easily have negative effects. 
That  does  not  mean  that  we  should  forget  their  ingenuousness  in  offering  the 
opportunity to separate risks from their source and lead them to parties that are 
willing to bear them while getting a chance to a matching reward. The simpler a 
derivative is, the fewer places for manipulation it leaves, but this does not mean that 
derivatives should be completely eliminated. Where do these instruments become 
toxic?  Exactly  where  they  lack  transparency  and  therefore  information,  and  we 
cannot think of a better concept of value that aims at offering more information than 
fair value does. How this will actually be done remains to be seen, but one thing is 
for sure. We cannot sacrifice such a concept in order to find a “scapegoat” for the 
current financial crisis. The precise process through which fair values are reached 
needs  to  be  acknowledged  to  investors  in  order  to  regain  their  trust,  as  current 
international accounting regulations also require. 
Once again, we will all have to learn from the crisis, while each chain of the 
financial system must review its role, attributions and responsibilities, permanently 
encouraging informational transparency. If this entire pleading still didn’t succeed in 
bringing you over to the side of fair value, we conclude by saying about fair value 
accounting what Churchill said about democracy, namely that it is the worst system 
with the exception of all others. 
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